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The Bias of Constitutional Property: Toward
Compensation for the Elimination of
Statutory Entitlements
John Brigham*
Debate over the Constitution's protection for property is
heating up after fifty years of relative calm.' As a result there is
considerable fluidity to what is protected by the right.2 On the one
hand, individual prerogatives over property in land and commer-
cial enterprise have grown as a function of deregulation. On the
other, governmental obligations to holders of statutory entitle-
ments like social security, only recently acknowledged as a new
property right, seem to be diminishing. The rights associated with
traditional forms of property, while perhaps less comprehensive
than they appear to the public, have always been far more gener-
ous than the rights to property associated with the welfare state.
Protection for entitlements, from education to social welfare pro-
grams, though more substantial than in the past, is a shadow of the
protection traditionally afforded to property. This article proposes
that statutory entitlements to property be given full property pro-
tection, including the entitlement-holder's right to just compensa-
tion under the Constitution's "takings clause." This would be a
more equitable interpretation of the constitutional property right
that would eliminate the bias in favor of some forms of property.
Property is conventionally associated with individual posses-
sion and control. Like all legal rights, however, property rights de-
pend on the state and its governing apparatus for enforcement. 3
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Law and Inequality
The state grants a range of action to property-right holders. They
can exclude others, accrue benefits, and otherwise enjoy what is
theirs. The legal justification for this right is that settled or legiti-
mate expectations deserve state protection. 4 The tradition of con-
stitutional guarantees for property has been legally based on the
due process and just compensation provisions of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. 5
Since at least 1970, with Goldberg v. Kelly,6 legitimate expec-
tations to statutory entitlements such as Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (hereinafter AFDC) have been recognized by
the courts as property. This development suggests a property right
which could be pivotal relative to both liberty and equality in the
modern state.7 Now more than ever, with commitments to public
assistance under attack, property rights need even more compre-
hensive and searching attention than they might get in more chari-
table periods.8
This approach to entitlement policy combines political theory,
public policy analysis and institutional jurisprudence. Law, in the
form of judicial decisions interpreting the United States Constitu-
tion, is a source for the examination of bias in the meaning of con-
stitutional property. The proposal, however, is not simply a
description of doctrine handed down by the Justices as authorita-
tive, nor a prediction of what future Justices will decide. This is a
commentary on protection for property in the Constitution which
operates from the premise that the fundamental law must be im-
partial and non-discriminatory in order for it to anchor a govern-
f aent that derives its authority from the consent of the governed.
The Constitutional Tradition
Once central to liberal theory, the property right has been
missing, since at least 1937, from various treatments of the civil
liberties protected by the Constitution.9 The idea that property
and liberty could be separated began in the industrial revolution.10
4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
5. See note 18 and accompanying text for discussion of these clauses. Back-
ground is also available in Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 456-73
(1978); Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 441-500 (11th ed.
1985).
6. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
7. Roger Cotterrell, The Law of Property and Legal Theory, in Legal Theory
and Common Law 96 (William Twining ed. 1986).
8. See Kathi V. Friedman, Legitimation of Social Rights and the Western Wel-
fare State: A Weberian Perspective 63-75 (1981).
9. See Henry Abraham, Freedom and the Court 9-15 (3d ed. 1977).
10. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733, 772-74 (1964).
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Since the early part of the twentieth century, a period known in
constitutional law as the "Lochner Era,"" reform movements at-
tacked property as protection for the few over the many. The
right was effectively expelled from the debate on constitutional
principles governed by the post-1937 doctrine of the "double stan-
dard."' 2 This standard emphasized civil rather than economic lib-
erties,1 3 and an "idea of progress,"' 4 based in the promise of equal
protection in the fourteenth amendment. Property has remained
peripheral to the canon of civil liberties in spite of the economic
implications in right to counsel, equal protection, and freedom of
the press. Of course, protection of property has not disappeared,
but its status as a civil liberty, a constitutionally protected right of
every citizen, has received minimal attention.
Paradoxically, it may have been the growth of these political
liberties in the last fifty years that called attention to property
rights. Now, real estate and commercial interests draw support
from civil liberties and from two generations of activism over fun-
damental rights. They are also getting more protection from an in-
creasingly conservative federal judiciary.i5 Yet, particularly
because property is associated with the civil libertarian promise of
contemporary constitutional government, the right to property
cannot serve simply as protection for the rich or a shield for the
wealthy. The modern constitutional system requires that rich and
poor be treated the same. This look at constitutional property at-
tacks some troubling biases in constitutional law.
The Old Property
When the United States Constitution was written, the tension
between possession of property under the common law with its
principle of salus populi, or the public good, and the Lockean con-
ception of property as a vested right, was particularly evident.' 6
11. The "Lochner" era derives its names from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), a leading cure illustrating the Court's willingness to scrutinize and invali-
date economic regulations pursuant to the due process clause. In Lochner, the
Supreme Court struck down New York law that imposed a 60 hour work week
limit on laundry workers. The Court held that the law was an unconsitutional in-
fringement on the freedom to contract because the law was not directly and signifi-
cantly related to the promotion of employee health.
12. Abraham, supra note 9, at 15.
13. Richard Funston, A Vital National Seminar: The Supreme Court in Ameri-
can Political Life 199-206 (1978); Gunther, supra note 5, at 467-470.
14. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1970).
15. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Bat-
tle at Midway, 70 Judicature 324, 324-30 (1987).
16. We see, in the debates over ratification in this period, an older and more
communal conception being challenged by the newer, "vested right" form of prop-
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Mechanisms to protect economic interests appear throughout the
Constitution. Article I established federal power to regulate com-
merce, coin money and punish pirates while limiting state power
to impair "the obligation of Contracts."17 Article IV provides for
payment of debts against the United States. The term property,
however, is initially used only in the fifth amendment which pro-
vides that no citizen "shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." 18
Rather than rely on the fifth amendment, the early Supreme
Court protected economic interests by referring to the various
other constitutional provisions. In the 1810 case of Fletcher v.
Peck,19 Chief Justice Marshall relied on the contract clause to pre-
vent governmental whim from denying legitimate expectations.2 0
Before the Civil War, slavery cast an ominous shadow over consti-
tutional property in an industrializing economy. In this period, in-
terests that ranged from judicial appointments and the legal status
of appointment papers to franchises to do business were the con-
tested forms of property.2 1
Due process protection of property emerged after the Civil
War when property, grounded in the fourteenth amendment, be-
gan to be viewed in terms of its value in the market (exchange
value) rather than for its utility (or use) value.22 This made the
right much more appropriate to an expanding industrial order and
made the fifth and fourteenth amendments the basis for constitu-
tional protection of property. Before judicial attention turned
away from regulation of the economy in 1937, a conception of con-
stitutional property had developed. This conception remained sig-
nificant for a very long period due to the limited number of
constitutional pronouncements on economic issues.
The Bundle of Rights
Justice Holmes set the conceptual framework for property in
erty. See Carl J. Friedrich, Rights, Liberties, Freedoms: A Reappraisal, 57 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 841 (1963).
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See generally Benjamin F. Wright, Jr., The
Contract Clause of the Constitution (1938); C. Peter Magrath, Yazoo: Law and Poli-
tics in the New Republic (1966).
18. U.S. Const. amend. V.
19. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
20. Id. at 133-39. The case involved fraudulent land sales by a state legislature
and the implications for innocent secondary purchasers.
21. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
22. John R. Commons, The Legal Foundations of Capitalism 11 (1924).
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the Constitution, as he did for so many other aspects of modern
constitutional law. In the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon,23 he addressed a situation where a coal mine had been dug
beneath land to which a Pennsylvania coal mining company held
subsurface rights. Mahon, who lived in a house above the mine,
tried to stop the tunnelling on the basis of a state statute prohibit-
ing such activity. Giving new life to the fifth amendment just com-
pensation clause, Holmes referred to the "extent of the
diminution" of property rights24 and treated property as a bundle
of rights. This conception would modify the "takings" provision to
allow property to be protected even though full legal title to the
property did not change hands. Holmes wrote in Pennsylvania
Coal that "a strong public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change." 25 The Penn-
sylvania statute, the Court held, had "taken" mine property.26
Since 1922, Holmes' concept of a "bundle" has called attention to
the intangible rights in property and has provided the framework
for a movement away from things and toward expectations. 27
The "takings" issue has become a matter of evaluating expec-
tations and balancing those that are found to be legitimate against
the police power of the state. Some environmentalists have said
that the compensation scale derived from the "bundle of rights" is
a grant to propertied interests which unfairly limits the capacity of
the state to regulate. Fred Bosselman, an influential environmen-
tal lawyer, David Callies and John Banta, argued for elimination
of this framework in favor of holding regulations "invalid only if
they fail to bear a reasonable relationship to a valid public pur-
pose." 28 Bosselman and his colleagues who sought to strengthen
the land use planning process, acknowledged that "[a]n actual ap-
propriation of land for public use, such as for a park, highway or
reservoir, must be accompanied by compensation. "29 While the
policy behind any expropriation will inevitably be ripe for dispute,
where there is a substantial expropriation under the police power,
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
24. Id. at 413.
25. Id. at 416.
26. Id. at 414.
27. See for further discussion, C.B. MacPherson, A Political Theory of Prop-
erty, in Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (1973).
28. Fred Bosselman, David Callies & John Banta, The Taking Issue: A Study of
the Constitutional Limits of Governmental Authority to Regulate the Use of Pri-
vately-Owned Land Without Paying Compensation to the Owners 246 (1973) [here-
inafter Bosselman].
29. Id. at 254.
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there is also a widespread expectation of compensation.3 0 As a
constitutional conception for the public health and welfare author-
ity of the state, the police power stands against the autonomy of
the property right. Under the Constitution, the power is limited
by the due process and compensation provisions. This includes the
traditional requirement that property could only be taken by the
government from private hands for public use.31
The 1984 case of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 32 is
particularly illustrative of modern developments in the public use
standard. In that case, the state instituted a land condemnation
program to transfer property to tenants. According to Justice
O'Connor, regulating oligopoly, like that of the Hawaiian land-
lords, and the evils associated with it was within the parameters of
the traditional exercise of a state's police powers.33 The existence
of a transfer of property to private hands did not seem to matter.
Justice O'Connor's decision draws on an old maxim that there are
and always have been limits on property ownership. These limits
were characterized by Justice Jackson thirty-nine years earlier,
who said, "Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute
against all the world are certainly rare ... ."34 Today there is rela-
tively little doubt about state power over property, but controversy
continues over the legitimate reach of the police power and what
constitutes the settled expectation behind a property right.
Settled Expectations
In his treatise on constitutional law, Laurence Tribe de-
scribed a model of "settled expectations" as a distinctive form of
constitutional adjudication.35 According to Tribe, the Constitution
places "restraints on government power" which vest rights in
property on the grounds "that certain settled expectations . . .
should be secure against governmental disruption, at least without
appropriate compensation."36 A review of Supreme Court deci-
sions since 1789 reveals that property protection grounded in the
Constitution is a matter of expectations that have been settled or
legitimated in some fashion, as by title, grant or the decision of a
30. Baker, supra note 3, at 766-67.
31. U.S. Const. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
32. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
33. Id. at 231.
34. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
35. Tribe, supra note 5, at 456-57.
36. Id. at 456.
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court, rather than by mere possession of tangible things.3 7
Property litigation often concerns what the state must pay
the property owner-what constitutes adequate compensation. 38
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City 39 illustrates one aspect
of the contemporary doctrine of settled expectations where, as a
theoretical basis for the decision, the Supreme Court balanced
state power over historic preservation against expected gains on
land held by the company. The case involved restrictions placed
on development of historic landmarks by New York City. The
Court of Appeals of New York held that the city had not denied
due process to the corporation because the landmark regulation
"permitted the same use as had been made of the Terminal for
more than half a century" and "the appellants had failed to show
that they could not earn a reasonable return on their investment
.... "40 The United States Supreme Court, in reviewing the deci-
sion, addressed whether denial of a permit to build over the
landmark train station constituted a "taking." Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Brennan admitted the Court had been unable to de-
velop any set formula for determining when "economic injuries
caused by public action [must] be compensated .. ".."41 He indi-
cated that although "takings" are more readily found where there
is a "physical invasion" 42 by government, the broader understand-
ing is that to require compensation, a "taking" may simply inter-
fere with interests "sufficiently bound up with the reasonable
expectation of the claimant to constitute 'property' for fifth
amendment purposes."4 3 The Court held that Penn Central was
not deprived of a "reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site
.... ,"44 Hence the regulation did not amount to a constitutional
"taking." The opinion reveals a commitment to evaluating the
property right in terms of expectations.
Grounded in the relationship between individuals and the
state, adjudication of compensation questions turns on expecta-
tions. There is not a hard and fast line. There are simply ways of
acknowledging the relative autonomy of particular individual (or
corporate) interests within the structure of constitutional author-
37. See John Brigham, Property & the Supreme Court Do the Justices Make
Sense?, 16 Polity 242 (1983).
38. See Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 63, 65-66.
39. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
40. Id. at 121.
41. Id. at 124.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 125.
44. Id. at 138.
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ity. The relationship between the individual and the state is dealt
with in the Constitution by a conceptual apparatus that triggers
the just compensation clause when private control and use is di-
minished. An effort to balance social and individual interests
through principled standards has characterized evaluation of prop-
erty claims under the Constitution. The principled standards,
however, have not applied to all forms of settled expectation to the
same extent. The next section examines the newer expectations
and considers the extent to which they can be distinguished from
property in land and transferable forms of wealth.
"New" Property45
As far back as Marbury v. Madison,46 in 1803, the Supreme
Court recognized that actions by government create expectations.
The things that were expected in the early nineteenth century
ranged from William Marbury's judgeship47 to Dartmouth Col-
lege's charter4s and monopolies like the one held by the Charles
River Bridge Company.49 More recently, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that "'[p]roperty' . . . may be construed to include ob-
ligations, rights and other intangibles as well as physical things."50
Now, with the rise of the welfare state and the federal regulatory
apparatus, the range of expectations encompasses nearly all as-
pects of social life. The constitutional guarantee has meant that,
where the expectations are legitimate or settled, they will be
respected by government as property. Because these modern ex-
pectations have come to be known as new property, this terminol-
ogy will be used in this article, although the thesis of the article is
that the essence of the property right has not changed.
Given the longstanding recognition of a property right in in-
tangible expectations, the thing that is new about property to
which people are entitled by statute as part of the social service
commitment of the modern state is the particluar interest, the in-
tangible or tangible thing that is expected. Social Security is one of
these relatively recent expectations, as is AFDC. Licenses to run
nuclear reactors are "new" in much the same way. The applica-
tion of the constitutional property right, however, in historical
45. See Reich, supra note 10. (Treatment proceeds as an historical survey with
emphasis on the link between "1old" and "new" property).
46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
47. Id.
48. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 519
(1819).
49. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 26 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
50. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Arenz, 290 U.S. 66, 68 (1933).
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practice grew out of comparable expectations based on licenses for
economic activity and a great variety of grants from the govern-
ment. These were some of the first subjects of constitutional pro-
tection as property.
The courts have had a great deal to say about which expecta-
tions would be considered legitimate or settled. At one time much
was made of a distinction between individual rights surrounding
the old property and privileges adhering in government largess.
This distinction is evident in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bed-
ford,51 an 1892 opinion by Oliver Wendell Holmes when he was a
judge in Massachusetts. In McAuliffe, Holmes wrote, "The Peti-
tioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman."5 2 The right-privilege
distinction evident in McAuliffe, denied constitutional protection
where a benefit or expectation was the result of government lar-
gess. In the Supreme Court, although the fifth amendment was
read to tie due process to "real or personal 'property'," the exten-
sion of constitutional protection to modern forms of property has
come only recently.53 While once distinguishing traditional prop-
erty from social welfare benefits, the right-privilege distinction be-
gan to break down by the mid-twentieth century especially in the
areas of welfare benefits and public employment. 54
Benefits and Employment
The initial application of constitutional property status to
benefits involved Social Security. Since this program was set up
along the lines of private insurance programs and insurance bene-
fits are recognized as protected property, it is no surprise that the
property right in entitlements emerged here. The Social Security
Act was held constitutional in 1937.55 Then in lemming v. Nes-
tor,56 the Justices addressed the status of benefits owed to an
otherwise eligible family where the wage-earner was being de-
ported for having been a member of the Communist party.57 The
Court focused on the nature of an entitlement to Social Security
and held that entitlement to benefits did not constitute an "ac-
51. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
52. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
53. Tribe, supra note 5, at 509-10.
54. See William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968).
55. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937).




crued property right,"58 but that benefits were a form of interest
that could be withdrawn simply on the basis of a rational justifica-
tion.59 Although the outcome went against the claimant, consider-
ation of the case by the Court, the lower court decision and the
dissents revealed support for fuller property protection of this in-
terest. The lower court decision struck down the provision in the
Social Security Act on which denial of benefits was based60 and
the dissents by Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Warren indi-
cated support for the property right.61
The political climate in the 1960s brought increasing sensitiv-
ity to obligations arising from public assistance programs. In 1961,
the Court held that when public employment was terminated
there had to be an unusually important government need to out-
weigh the right of the individual being terminated to have a hear-
ing.62  A few years later, Charles Reich called statutory
entitlements "the new property"63 and set off a series of develop-
ments advancing the status of this form of property. In the second
of his two articles on the subject, Reich argued that the welfare
state had altered the status of individuals and that benefits like
unemployment compensation, public assistance, and old-age insur-
ance urgently need to be recognized by society as a right.64
The 1970 case which explicitly and authoritatively recognized
statutory entitlements as property, Goldberg v. Kelly,65 pitted New
York City and state welfare authorities against beneficiaries who
had been cut off without a chance to respond. The Department of
Social Services terminated a recipient because he refused to accept
counseling and rehabilitation for a drug addiction that he denied
having.66 Justice Brennan noted in Goldberg that, "[i]t may be re-
alistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property'
than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes
the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common law
concepts of property."67 Brennan referred to unemployment com-
pensation, tax exemptions, and employment security as being the
58. Id. at 608.
59. Id. at 611. See also Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitu-
tion 268 n.115 (1977).
60. Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F.Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1959).
61. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 621-40.
62. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961).
63. Reich, supra note 10.
64. Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 Yale L. J. 1245, 1255-56 (1965).
65. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
66. Id. at 256.
67. Id. at 262, n.8.
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sort of property that fell beyond the old common law conception of
property.68 Property in statutory entitlements had gone beyond
mere intelligibility and had become authoritative.
Entitlement as property was amplified soon after Goldberg.
In Perry v. Sindermann,69 the property interest amounted to con-
tinued employment at a Texas college derived from an "under-
standing fostered by the college administration." 70 In that case,
Justice Stewart acknowledged that tenure could be an interest
protected by a property right.71 The Court stated that "'property'
denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by 'existing
rules or understandings'" and that "[a] person's interest in a bene-
fit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if there are
such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his
claim of entitlement to the benefit." 72
A subsequent decision held that "[p]roperty interests of
course, are not created by the Constitution: Rather... by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law ... ."73 Protection would not necessarily be af-
forded to any general benefit prior to its being granted by the
state.7 4 The new right replaced minimal protection in cases of sus-
pension and revocation of a benefit, with a presumption favoring
continuation of the benefit.75 In Goss v. Lopez,76 the Court found
such interests present where high school students were suspended
from their classes without a hearing. The Court held that the dep-
rivation was substantial enough to overcome concern about the ed-
ucational process.77 The decision reflected the "bundle of rights"
scale suggested by Holmes,78 in which due process was treated as
variable and the nature of the property interest determined what
process was due.
The Modern Practice
Although entitlement claims were less successful in the
Supreme Court during the mid-1970s, and the conservatism of the
68. Id.
69. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
70. Id. at 600.
71. Id. at 601.
72. Id. at 601 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
73. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 n.7 (1976)(quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
74. See Reich, supra note 10, at 785-86. (Reich, however, mentioned a basis for
his new property in the "individual's rightful share in the commonwealth.").
75. Reich, supra note 10, at 785.
76. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
77. Id. at 584.
78. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
1987]
Law and Inequality
Justices affected case outcomes, the Court generally acknowledged
the "new property" in entitlements. The Supreme Court allowed
termination of federal disability benefits without a prior hearing,
for instance, while granting that benefits provided by the govern-
ment were a "statutorily created property interest protected by the
fifth amendment."79 Other litigants were unsuccessful before the
Court, but the Justices at least acknowledged the "new property"
in entitlements in situations such as a foster family desiring to re-
main intact,8 0 a state prisoner facing transfer to another facility,8 '
and a medical student claiming to have been unjustly dismissed
from school.8 2
Some "new property" appeals to the Supreme Court have
been successful. These cases have exhibited a sensitivity for the
powerlessness associated more often with civil liberties than eco-
nomic issues. In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,83 the
utility company claimed an absolute right to discontinue service
when bills had not been paid. The Supreme Court, however, saw
an exception when the bill was the subject of a "bona fide dis-
pute."8 4 The Court held that the company would be liable for
damages if the dispute turned out to be legitimate.85 State protec-
tion against termination of utility service, except for cause,
amounted to a property interest the Court was willing to
recognize.
Since protection for statutory entitlements came at a time of
diminished concern for more marketable forms of property, legal
commentators often drew on civil libertarian values to enhance
protection of traditional forms of property.86 This phenomenon is
evident in a plea by constitutional authority Gerald Gunther that
the status of civil rights be returned to old-fashioned property.8 7
He sought support in Justice Stewart's observation that
"[p]roperty does not have rights. People have rights."88 Justice
Stewart made his comment to support constitutional protections
for homes and savings accounts by associating them with estab-
79. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (The Court did require a post-
deprivation hearing).
80. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
81. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
82. Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
83. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
84. 1 at 10.
85. Id.
86. Gerald Gunther, Individual Rights in Constitutional Law: Cases and Materi-
als 160-69 (3d ed. 1981).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 163 (quoting Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552
(1972)).
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lished rights to travel and to the continuation of welfare benefits.8 9
In 1981, by an 8-1 majority, the Supreme Court ruled that a
worker who quits a job because it conflicts with religious beliefs
may not be denied unemployment compensation.90 The case in-
volved a Jehovah's Witness who quit a factory job after he was as-
signed to work on armored military vehicles.9 1 Here, religious
belief constituted an adequate basis for a compensable loss of work
for all the Justices but Rehnquist.92
After Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart on the
bench, the Court continued to draw on civil rights to protect eco-
nomic interests. In his 1982 opinion in Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co. ,93 Justice Blackmun boldly restated the definition of
property as "an individual entitlement grounded in state law" 94
and ruled in favor of a shipping clerk with a short leg who claimed
that he "had been unlawfully terminated because of his physical
handicap." 95 The protected property was a traditional common
law entitlement, a cause of action in the legal terminology,96 pro-
vided by the Fair Employment Practices Act.97 The opinion
reveals an enthusiasm for protection of the powerless. This enthu-
siasm is at the core of contemporary concern for civil liberties and
stands in sharp contrast to the attitude expressed by the Supreme
Court 150 years earlier when it described the poor as a "moral
pestilence."98
Another 1982 Supreme Court case provided further evidence
of the civil libertarian influence on constitutional property. In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,99 a "takings"
claim arose over a New York statute which provided that a land-
lord must permit a cable television company to install its equip-
ment in her building. In holding that the statute amounted to a
"taking" of property under the Constitution, Justice Marshall em-
phasized the personal aspects of ownership and the use-value of
property when he wrote that "an owner suffers a special kind of
injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's
89. Lynch, 405 U.S. at 552.
90. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
91. Id. at 707.
92. Id. at 720-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
94. Id. at 430.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 430.
97. Id. at 424. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 48,
para. 851-58, repealed by P.A. 81-1509, Art. I, § 35 (1980) (Smith-Hurd 1987).
98. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837).
99. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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property."100 The concern was for a very old right in conflict with
the state's support for a new technology and its corporate purvey-
ors. The sensitivity to property in this case appears to be a conse-
quence of the concern for civil liberties as much as the tradition of
protection for economic interests.10 1
The discussion of property that follows anticipates increasing
instability in this developing area of constitutional law. As the leg-
islative and judicial branches seem likely to become increasingly
polarized, judicial doctrine alone will become inadequate to fully
explain the nature of the fundamental right. The character of a
proposed impartial right is outlined along lines emphasizing consti-
tutional principle and the practice of policy formation. Since it is
naive to ignore the recent conservative backlash against entitle-
ment protection, the argument relies, ultimately, on the conserva-
tive principle of obligation.
The Compensation Issue
Having identified the constitutional tradition of property with
settled expectations and considered the modern development of
constitutional property along civil liberties lines, it is now possible
to examine a form of constitutional property that would really in-
corporate civil libertarian concerns. A conception of property that
does not have an essential class bias requires seeing entitlements
as property in the full sense of the term. The transformation of en-
titlements into fully-protected property under the Constitution re-
mains incomplete, falling short of traditional protections for
property by focusing exclusively on procedural due process protec-
tion. This provides only part of the constitutional protection ac-
corded older forms of property.
In the traditional property calculation, rights have substance.
For example, landowners who have to make way for a freeway or
powerline are often well compensated. 0 2 Where expectations of
entitlements are altered by a change in policy such as the 1983 So-
cial Security benefit cuts, however, there is no compensation of-
fered. At best, when faced with denial of benefits, a welfare
recipient gets a hearing, but if his program is cut back, the govern-
100. Id. at 436.
101. See also Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983). The
Supreme Court found the Mennonites had not been adequately notified about a
sale of their property for nonpayment of taxes and stated that due process was as
important as the property issue.
102. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Emi-
nent Domain (1985), for one of the more provocative recent treatments of this
issue.
[Vol. 5:405
BIAS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
ment is not necessarily obliged by law to honor its promises
although we call them entitlements. The following discussion of
changes in policy begins with some traditional dimensions of statu-
tory entitlements and then turns to the implications of a compen-
sation calculus for entitlements holders.
Some Traditional Considerations
"Taking" is the expression in constitutional law for serious
injury to property by government. When a constitutional "taking"
is deemed to have occurred, some form of compensation must re-
sult. 03 Advocates of fundamental rights are generally satisfied
with procedural protection for entitlement holders, rather than
pushing for compensation. 04 This cautious approach may be due
to the fact that, while the protection afforded by procedural due
process is limited, it is certainly preferable to no protection at all.
Images of the distinction between rights and privileges in the not
too distant past and the judicial philosophies dominating the appel-
late bench in the Lochner era are sobering. 0 5 Before the civil
rights revolution of the post-World War II period, the Supreme
Court applied the constitutional guarantees for settled expecta-
tions in a manner that favored entrenched interests and protected
those who already had the upper hand. Although this legacy and
recent conservative appointments to the federal bench by the Rea-
gan Administration cloud the future of the new property in the
federal courts, that future will also be influenced by decades of
sensitivity to civil rights.
The market conception of property, the cost distribution ra-
tionale of compensation, and constitutional sensitivity to ex post
facto laws comprise aspects of policy analysis in the United States
that explain the nature of constitutional protection for entitle-
ments and show the limited protection for newer kinds of prop-
erty. These traditional considerations have helped to define the
protection of property in practice. These considerations will be ex-
amined below in order to assess the costs of a more just constitu-
tional property right.
Market Factors
For commentators like Bruce Ackerman, the absence of con-
103. The expression is derived from the "takings" or "just compensation" clause
of the fifth amendment which, in pertinent part, reads "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.
104. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 5, at 543.
105. Goldman, supra note 15, at 324-27.
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stitutional protection for statutory entitlements is due to a limited
conception of property protected by the Constitution as "private
wealth."106 According to this theory, the basis for the protected
right has been trade and the ability to transfer interests-a charac-
teristic of some forms of statutory property, like liquor licenses,
taxi medallions, and development rights, but not others, like wel-
fare entitlements.O7 Compensation seems to symbolize the higher
status accorded to property when the right is associated with the
market. Although neither property rights nor the market could
exist as we know it without the state, the tradition has been to
protect commercial expectations more fully than those which may
be private, but have no commercial potential, 0 8 like the expecta-
tions of parents with regard to benefits promised to their
children.109
The puzzle about market or commercial considerations, as
they come into play in the constitutional context, is that they have
little to do with hard work or creativity and everything to do with
expectations made legitimate in the law. Rights associated with
the old property promise to protect wealth by a standard of mar-
ket opportunities. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City,110 for instance, the decision by the Supreme Court
rested, at least in part, on how much the company could reason-
ably expect as a return on its property."' The Court's attention
was on the legitimate expectation of return on corporate property
when it held that the transportation company was not prevented
from making substantial profits on its building because it was not
absolutely precluded from altering the structure.112 If New York
City had interfered in such a way as to preclude the company from
reaping a reasonable benefit from its land and building, it would
106. Ackerman, supra note 59, at 269. Little has been made out of the fact that
the wording of the fifth amendment links compensation to "private property" but
the potential for issues arising from the wording remains.
107. Id.
108. In U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court struck
down regulations impairing the claims of bond holders. In Atkins v. Parker, 472
U.S. 115 (1986), food stamp benefits were reduced with only general notice of a
change in the regulation from the state.
109. See generally Before the Hearings on H.I 341 Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Education and the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Educa-
tion, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of Alice James, teacher) (opposition to
the phase out and eventual elimination of Social Security Survivors benefits for
post-secondary students affected by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981) [hereinafter Hearings].
110. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 136-37.
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have been required to compensate the transportation company."i 3
This protection of future benefits has been broad ever since intan-
gible interests came under the constitutional mantle.
In the 1986 case of Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. ,114 Justice White discussed the "takings" issue in the context
of statutorily created financial liability of employers for contribu-
tions to a pension plan beyond those for which they had con-
tracted. The Court held that Congress could increase private
liability in the interest of public welfare and social responsibility
without being obligated to consider compensation."i 5 Protection
for property grounded in market considerations, or what Justice
White termed "investment backed" expectations, supported the
idea that because the field of employee pension plans was already
heavily regulated, employers had adequate warning that Congress
may increase their liability." 6 This strange transposition of the
"takings" logic suggests that the key to the interest protected by
compensation is not commerce. Instead, the sovereign authority
to protect the public welfare is consistently the primary
consideration.
Distributing Costs
One way to understand the policy of compensation is in terms
of the distribution of social costs. The traditional argument for
compensation is that monetary payment to one suffering a loss dis-
tributes the costs resulting from public action."i 7 A property
owner whose backyard is needed for a subway station is not ex-
pected to make extraordinary personal sacrifices to subsidize the
common good. Rather, the costs resulting from public action are
distributed. Although owners can be forced to part with their
land, compensation addresses the loss.
Welfare recipients with a legitimate expectation of benefits,
who are often disabled or raising families on what they receive,
might be expected to make the same claim as someone losing a
piece of their backyard, that any losses due to government action
affecting their expectation, like a cutback of benefits, be distrib-
uted. Historically, the public and the political response to
threatened changes in benefit packages, like the 1983 Social Secur-
ity changes dropping the education benefit for surviving chil-
113. Id.
114. 475 U.S. 211, 106 S.Ct. 1018 (1986).
115. 106 S.Ct. at 1024-28.
116. Id. at 1027.
117. See e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
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dren,118 has raised policy issues with regard to competing public
goods and the significance of the affected groups for legislators.119
The compensation requirement would ground the rights of entitle-
ment holders in society's expressed commitment to the distribu-
tion of social costs. The effect would be to honor entitlements and
the rights of those who claim this kind of property, just as the ex-
pectations of other kinds of property holders have traditionally
been honored.
The tradition of distributing social costs has other policy
dimensions. Beyond what the Court held in Connolly regarding
the unfairness of forcing some to bear disproportionate social bur-
dens,12o compensating an owner may lessen the resistance and dis-
content caused by the threat of loss.121 Compensation is thus an
instrument of right and justice that can have some consequences,
such as lessening the political resistance of those losing entitle-
ments, that warrant careful examination.
Retroactivity
A more technical body of legislative concerns surrounds ret-
roactivity. Protection from bills of attainder and ex post facto laws
are among the most settled rights in the Constitution, and they es-
tablish a presumption that legislation should be prospective.1 22
Early adjudication of constitutional property under the contract
clause focused on when and under what conditions a legislature
could change its mind. In Fletcher v. Peck 123 and Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward ,124 the Court held that the Con-
stitution limited the degree to which legislatures could rescind a
prior action. Modern constitutional discussion of retroactivity
draws heavily on the due process clause of the fifth amendment125
rather than the contract clause. Consequently, the range of expec-
tations covered is broader. This is evident in recent cases on pen-
118. See Paul Light, Artful Work: The Politics of Social Security Reform 33-44
(1985). Prior to the changes, surviving children received benefits until they were 22
if they went to college.
119. See Fred Block, Richard A. Cloward, Barbara Ehrenreich & Frances Fox
Piven, The Mean Season 92-101 (1987); See also Hearings, supra note 109, at 36-43.
See generally Anthony Champagne & Edward J. Harpham, The Attack on the Wel-
fare State (1984).
120. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
121. Ackerman, supra note 59, at 150-67.
122. See Wright, supra note 17, at 10, 33-34.
123. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
124. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
125. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); See
also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct. 2111 (1987).
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sion funds.126
Justice Brennan, for a unanimous Court in Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,127 points out that the calculation
of retroactivity rights in areas of socio-economic legislation carries
the constitutional burden of showing that Congress has acted arbi-
trarily and irrationally.128 The Court held that retroactivity must
be examined in the context of a presumption in favor of constitu-
tionality, but that retroactivity is a matter about which the Jus-
tices must be sensitive.129 The analysis of state mandated pension
requirements in Gray turns on the legitimate expectations of em-
ployers who are forced to fund the pensions. The claims of the
employers for protection from what they call "retroactive legisla-
tion" fall short in the context of judicial restraint because legisla-
tive action was based on interests and expectations on the part of
employees. 130 Those who have been promised a stipend from So-
cial Security or a state license have legitimate expectations. If the
expectation of a particular grant is extended for a fixed period,
like Social Security survivor's benefits to children until they reach
eighteen, then it would seem that a cutoff prior to that time
should be a violation of legitimate expectations warranting com-
pensation. These would not only be the present expectations of
the children promised benefits, but also the past expectations of
the parent, now dead, who paid into the system.131 The same con-
sequences and obligations arise where an AFDC recipient receives
a fifty dollar per month allocation for each of five children. The
state should acknowledge the expectation of that amount for those
already receiving benefits, if policymakers, for instance, tried to
then limit payment to three children due to budgetary stringency.
In practice, "grandfathering,"132 while it addresses some situations
of this sort, is quite often a policy based on accommodation to in-
terested parties and minimal protection in comparison to just com-
pensation under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. A
requirement of compensation for deprivation of statutory entitle-
126. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d 947 (1979) for
an elaborate retroactivity test.
127. 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
128. Id. at 729.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 729-32.
131. Wills and life insurance policies are enforced by the deceased parents' estate
in order to accommodate the decedent's wishes in disposing of property.
132. Originally associated with the Confederate States of America, the practice
of "grandfathering" extends the protection of past practice beyond its authoritative
life. See Hearings, supra note 109, at 36-43.
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ment property would mean that changes in policy would have to
honor obligations already incurred.
Entitlements, like survivor's benefits and AFDC, often in-
volve expectations bound up with family or life plans in the most
intimate way. At the very least, they are comparable to the rela-
tionship established between employer and employee when under-
taking a pension plan. In such situations, compensation for lost
property in entitlements plays a part in the fabric of social life by
distributing costs and honoring obligations in a way very similar to
compensation for lost expectations in land and commercial
interests.
The first section of this article considered the core meaning
of property and grounded the constitutional property right in legit-
imate expectations. In applying the just compensation provision to
statutory entitlements, however, questions about the market arise,
along with traditional deference in constitutional law to socio-eco-
nomic legislation. Interest in distributing social costs and a concern
for generally prospective legislation offer the possibility of treating
entitlements as property for purposes of the just compensation
clause. The following part of the article explores the traditional
tension in the policy process created by contrasts between rights
such as property and interests such as keeping the costs of govern-
ment down.
Rights and Policies
The conventional understanding that statutory entitlements
are created by legislation has been used to justify a freedom to
take entitlements away that is far greater than the historic con-
straints on the freedom to take property. In Anglo-American law,
the practice with regard to vested rights has been that they stand
above legislative authority and structure legislative prerogatives. 33
These practices have had a bearing on protection for entitlements
since some Justices would hold that legislators are capable of stip-
ulating the level of property that is created. Since legislators can
stipulate the level of property created by a statute, the argument
goes, they are also capable of narrowing the protected interest,134
for instance giving financial aid but saying the amount can be re-
duced at any time. 35 One approach has distinguished the policy
dimensions of property in entitlements from "accrued property
133. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); See also supra notes
19-20 and accompanying text.
134. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).
135. See generally Tribe, supra note 5, at 522-43.
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rights" on the basis of the need for legislative flexibility.'3 6 An-
other exhorts the poor to take "the bitter with the sweet" 37 as if
the inevitable price of getting protection from the state is being at
its mercy.' 3 8 Both formulations turn on the relationship between
rights and policies. The following section will address "the bitter
and the sweet" rationale for denying just compensation clause pro-
tection to statutory entitlements first and then turn to the concern
that legislatures should not be locked into the status quo.
"The Bitter and the Sweet"
The conservative wing on the present Supreme Court, partic-
ularly Chief Justice Rehnquist, proposes that legislatures may ad-
just the constitutional due process provided for any specific
entitlement as part of creating the entitlement in the first place.139
Justice Rehnquist's position appears to be that when property is
created by statute, the drafters are free to create precisely as much
property as they want.' 40 This argument for legislative discretion
would seem to lead toward an untenable view that the legislature
could pass a law making entitlement a totally discretionary matter,
leaving it up to the head of the welfare agency, for instance,
whether a benefit should continue. The "bitter and the sweet" per-
spective contains a very limited conception of constitutional pro-
tection of entitlements.
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning treats the policy process as if it
were outside the Constitution, yet the constitutional tradition has
meant that the legislature cannot create an entitlement in an arbi-
trary or discriminatory way.' 4 ' The tension between policy shifts
and settled expectations is central to the constitutional tradition
and has been an object of judicial controversy since the Yazoo land
deal that led to Fletcher v. Peck.142 In general, the judiciary has
been expected to defer to the legislature on broad matters of pub-
lic policy. The limits on legislative prerogative are at the mar-
136. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
137. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974).
138. See generally William B. Lockhart, The American Constitution 252-59 (5th
ed. 1981).
139. See Stephen J. Massey, Justice Rehnquist's Theory of Property, 93 Yale L. J.
541 (1984).
140. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).
141. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); See also Re-
gents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Gerald Gunther, Con-
stitutional Law 100 (Frederick Schauer, Supp. 1987).
142. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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gins. 143 The issue of just compensation arises from one of those
limits-the fifth amendment.
The idea of "the bitter and the sweet" in entitlements law
presents one view of the constitutional limits on legislation creat-
ing this form of property. This view was articulated in Arnett v.
Kennedy,'" in 1974, where a federal employee had been fired after
accusing his boss of bribery. The firing took place according to a
federal law that denied employees any right to a hearing until af-
ter they had been dismissed.145 In a plurality opinion, Justice
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger allowed the legislature to
limit procedural protections in its civil service statutes. The Court
held that the level of procedural due process required could vary
in entitlement cases and that the decision as to how much process
is "due" was for legislative bodies. 146 Justice Rehnquist's formula-
tion applies to constitutional due process protection. When it
comes to traditional just compensation issues Justice Rehnquist
does not seem to talk of "the bitter and the sweet," but stands be-
hind the legitimate expectations which bar state action without
compensation.14 7
In the end, perhaps the greatest flaw in the conservative the-
ory of "the bitter and the sweet" comes from its inconsistency with
some basic tenets of traditional conservatism. One of the most im-
portant developments in conservative thought is renewed attention
to social obligation.148 In Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obliga-
tions of Citizenship, Lawrence Mead describes the main problem
of the welfare state as its permissiveness and calls for the poor to
work for their benefits in order to satisfy their social obligation. 149
Mead's argument uses the economic theory of contemporary policy
analysis,150 but, at the core it rests squarely on more traditional
normative discourse of reciprocal obligations that forms such an
important part of entitlement rights. Like the obligation behind
proposals such as "workfare,"'151 the state has a duty to respect
143. See Frank Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979
Wash. U. L. Q. 659.
144. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
145. Id. at 137-39.
146. Id. at 152.
147. See Massey, supra.note 139, at 551.
148. See generally Lawrence M. Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obliga-
tions of Citizenship (1986).
149. Id. at 69-90.
150. Id. Mead uses cost-benefit calculations, economic metaphors and statistical
models in his analysis.
151. These proposals require willingness to train and be placed in a job to qualify
for welfare benefits. For a general discussion of these proposals, see Mead, supra
note 148.
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promises made to the poor in the same fashion that government
has accepted obligations to the wealthy.
The Status Quo
The "bitter and the sweet" as a response to entitlement
claims has led to apprehension that raising statutory entitlements
to the level of compensable property would bind legislators and
policy makers to the status quo. David Grais, in an influential arti-
cle on entitlements, states, "[i]f statutory entitlements and rights
are equated... [,] statutes that create entitlements to the continu-
ation of the benefit also create rights to the continuation of a bene-
fit, thereby making the benefit irrevocable."152 There is some
truth in what he says, but the fear that full property status for
statutory entitlements would chain legislators to the status quo is a
caricature of constitutional property protection and the right to
compensation. Under the constitutional right, compensation is
simply a spreading of the cost of interfering with a property right,
not an absolute prohibition on expropriation. The ways the cost
can be met are varied and they reflect the extent to which a prop-
erty interest is acknowledged.'5 3 Although the historical evolution
of public rights has been toward greater protection,lM the present
composition of the federal bench obscures that progress.
In the case of the tenured professor faced with job-threaten-
ing retrenchment policies, the full property right to continued em-
ployment would define the parameters for administrative choice,
but it would not eliminate choice altogether. Where that right is
secure, for example under a contract of statutory entitlement,
tight budgets might inevitably force cuts in other areas, such as
maintenance and plant operation and such cuts would, of course,
diminish the value of continued employment (since few people
like working in a building without heat or light). This would in
turn affect the cost of compensation.
Pressure comparable to that proposed for entitlement as a
function of the compensation calculus was evident in Boston
Firefighters Union, Local No. 718 v. NAACP,I55 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1983. In that case, minority firefighters sought
protection from layoffs under strict seniority, a guarantee won by
152. David Grais, Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of Property, 86 Yale L.
J. 695, 709 (1977).
153. See, e.g., the compensation calculus in Philip Nichols, The Law of Eminent
Domain §§ 8.1-8.10 (Julius L. Sackman, 3d ed. 1985).
154. See Anthony J. Waters, Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third
Party Benejiciary Rule, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1111 (1985).
155. 461 U.S. 477 (1983).
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the union from the state. The NAACP brought suit in district
court which ordered a modification in the seniority system to pro-
hibit the reduction of the number of minorities in the fire depart-
ment. The United States Court of Appeals, considering the
conflict between the statutorily established seniority system and
the court order as a case of two competing rights, held in favor of
the minority firefighters.15 6 Subsequent to the decision, however,
Massachusetts came up with enough money to stop the layoffs, and
the Supreme Court declared the case moot. 5 7 Policy was thus
made around the entitlement. 5 8
Though it is reasonable to fear vested interests 5 9 whenever
they threaten democratic processes, rights define the nature of de-
mocracy and settled expectations are a basis for allegiance in a
political system. The Constitution does not prevent the govern-
ment from taking property; it protects against arbitrary "takings"
and provides for just compensation.160 Because discrimination and
minority rights are treated under another rubric,1 1 the issue of
compensation did not arise, but perhaps the seniority interests of
white firefighters and teachers should have been compensated in
the interests of distributing the costs and minimizing resistance to
social change.
Rather than tying the hands of policy makers to the status
quo, compensation would simply require that entitlement policy be
made with deference to legitimate expectations. Policy must ac-
commodate rights in a constitutional democracy. Those with
power have long enjoyed respect for their expectations. The prom-
inence of civil rights now pushes courts to recognize new protected
interests in housing even where there is no statutory grant.'6 2 The
expectations of tenants or welfare recipients are already becoming
a factor in policy formation. When property takes the form of sup-
port payments or promises of benefits, the compensation issue
156. NAACP v. Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir.
1982).
157. 461 U.S. 477, 479 (1°83).
158. In subsequent cases, minorities have been more successful in establishing
affirmative action rights at the local level than in the Supreme Court, and in each
of these cases, conservatives have overturned policy on reverse discrimination
grounds. See generally, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S.Ct 1842 (1986).
159. McCann, infra note 163, at 146-47.
160. See Bickel, supra note 14, at 26-27.
161. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981) (the 7th Circuit held
that the fifth amendment entitled tenants to compensation for being displaced from
their homes when inspectors determined that the apartments were in violation of
the city's housing code).
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arises from legitimate expectations. In some programs such as stu-
dent financial aid, grants are contingent on future allocations and
the property claim is diminished. Compensation, however, would
at least become a consideration when policy shifts came up against
the settled expectations of entitlement holders.
In judicial interpretation of the Constitution there have been
two levels of property protection, one for the wealthy and one for
the poor. Outside the Supreme Court, commentary includes cau-
tion about relying on "legal contrivances" to produce social
change.16 3 There is legitimate concern that the real gains from a
revival of property rights will be for the wealthy and not the
newly entitled.' 64 But, the articulation of conceptions of new
rights and claims for economic justice have a vital legacy as the
work of Charles Reich and Staughton Lyad attest.'" Given that
property rights delineate fundamental guarantees, this article has
discussed the bias that exists and explored the implications of
eliminating this injustice. While the traditional property right has
never been an absolute barrier to government regulation, the prop-
erty right in new entitlements should not be powerless in the face
of policy shifts. Since the same government that assures the old
also guarantees the "new property," just compensation is necessary
for entitlements to be treated as property. The right to such com-
pensation for rich and poor alike is the only property right consis-
tent with the Constitution.
163. See Michael W. McCann, Resurrection and Reform: Perspectives on Prop-
erty in the American Constitutional Tradition, 13 Pol. & Soc'y 143 (1984).
164. See William Van Alstyne, Cracks in the 'New Property. Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445 (1977).
165. See Reich, supra note 10, at 772-74; see Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights,
62 Tex. L. Rev. 1417 (1984); See also Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal
Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509 (1984).
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